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1 - Multicultural societies and conflicts of loyalty: cultural crimes 
 
Multiculturalism and religious pluralism constantly pose new challenges to 
Western societies. From a juridical point of view, one of the main concerns 
is the management of the double belonging of “faithful citizens”, at the 
same time subject to the laws of the State and to the ones of their religious 
community. Religions also impose rules to be observed by their adherents 
and the compliance with these rules, sometimes very far from the 
traditional framework of secular legal systems, risks degenerating into 
misunderstandings and possible “conflicts of loyalty”. 
Actually, this type of moral conflict is not totally new: the 
phenomenon recalls some typical traits of the problem of conscientious 
objection, even if they differ for an essential aspect1. In the case of 
conscientious objection, the collision2 between mutually incompatible 
duties that bind the individual is characterized not only by the contradiction 
between the two precepts, but also for the subject's attitude of ideological 
opposition to the State rule, whose conformity to a superior ideal of justice 
                                                          
* Il contributo, sottoposto a valutazione, riproduce, aggiorna e amplia il testo della 
relazione presentata nell’ambito della Summer Doctoral School “Religion and atheism in 
pluralist societies” dell’IPRA - Institut du Pluralisme Religieux et de l’Athéisme (Nantes, 17-
19 giugno 2019), ed è destinato alla pubblicazione negli Atti. 
 
1 A. LICASTRO, Il motivo religioso non giustifica il porto fuori dell’abitazione del kirpan da 
parte del fedele sikh (considerazioni in margine alle sentenze n. 24739 e n. 25163 del 2016 della 
Cassazione penale), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Online review 
(www.statoechiese.it), n. 1, 2017, p. 5. 
2 R. BERTOLINO, L’obiezione di coscienza moderna, Giappichelli, Torino, 1994, p. 18. 
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is disputed and whose observance is, therefore, considered in itself 
negative3.  
On the contrary, this paper aims to analyse a completely different 
circumstance, where religious believers are not intimately opposed to the 
duty imposed by secular law. They simply are led by their moral conflict to 
break State criminal laws, supposing they are allowed to do so in the name 
of religious freedom and the related right to express their religious identity.  
From a strictly legal perspective, this is what doctrine has described 
as “cultural crime” or “culturally motivated crime”. The most commonly 
accepted definition of cultural crime is the one formulated by Jeroen Van 
Broeck almost 20 years ago: an act by a member of a minority culture, which 
is considered an offence by the legal system of the dominant culture. That 
same act is nevertheless, within the cultural group of the offender, 
condoned, accepted as normal behaviour and approved or even endorsed 
and promoted in the given situation4. 
The concept of “culture” has notoriously multiple meanings, but its 
first (and so far, only) legally relevant definition at international level is 
affirmed in UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of 2001: 
 
“culture should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that 
it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”5. 
 
Therefore, religion, as a belief, is certainly an aspect, and an essential 
one, of culture. 
At the same time, criminal law is the branch of law that more than 
any other is influenced by the so-called dominant culture, the culture which 
provides the ideological basis of the penal rule on which the defendant is 
tried6. This “cultural non-neutrality”, due to which criminal law is imbued7 
with culture and particularly affected by the identity profile of a particular 
population at a given historical moment8, leads to another typical feature of 
it: its “localism”, so that this branch of law has been efficaciously described 
as “typical local product”9. Given these two specificities, it is easy to 
                                                          
3 A. LICASTRO, Il motivo religioso, cit., p. 6. 
4 J. VAN BROECK, Cultural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences), 
in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 9/1, 2001, p. 5. 
5 UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2001. 
6 J. VAN BROECK, Cultural Defence, cit., p. 5. 
7 F. BASILE, I reati cd. “culturalmente motivati” commessi dagli immigrati: (possibili) 
soluzioni giurisprudenziali, in Questione Giustizia, n.1, 2017, p. 127. 
8 G. FIANDACA, Populismo politico e populismo giudiziario, in Criminalia, 2013, p. 103. 
9 F. BASILE, Immigrazione e reati culturalmente motivati, Giuffrè, Milano, 2010, p. 76. 
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understand their implications with respect to the phenomenon of crimes 
committed by immigrants for cultural or, more specifically, religious 
reasons: crimes, that is, committed by people who move from one State to 
another and that consequently find, in the place of arrival, a criminal law 
very different from that in force in the place of origin. 
Faced with this conflict between the criminal rule and the religious 
one rooted in the culture of the defendant, which accepts or endorses the 
same conduct, a legal system has necessarily to wonder whether or not it 
should recognise culture as a defence and to what extent. 
 
 
2 - The Italian reaction to cultural crimes 
 
In Italian criminal law, there are no general rules that give specific 
importance to the cultural factor10. 
This gap, however, is not surprising: both the Western countries that 
adopted, with regard to cultural diversity, a “multiculturalist” model (e.g. 
United Kingdom, Canada, USA) and those who otherwise chose an 
“assimilationist” approach (above all, France) have not introduced any 
clarification on the point yet11 and certainly Italy, with its “hybrid” policy12, 
could not make exception to this inactivity. 
The legislator's indifference in dealing with this topic thus led to the 
search for immediately usable solutions in the courtrooms13. From this 
point of view, the jurisdiction seemed to constitute a more accessible 
passage for new instances such as the multicultural ones, proving to have 
more adequate means available to intercept and incorporate social 
questions differently excluded from decision-making places. In this way, 
courtrooms have become the privileged channel for the resolution of issues 
raised by cultural crimes, a topic at the meantime broadly analysed by 
Italian scholars14. 
                                                          
10 P. DI FRESCO, A. NEGRI I reati culturalmente motivati, in Il Penalista, Giuffrè, Online 
review, 28 July 2017, p. 3. 
11 About these two models, L. BELLUCCI, Immigrazione e pluralità di culture: due modelli 
a confronto, in Sociologia del diritto, n. 3, 2001, p. 131 ss., F. BASILE, Società multiculturali, 
immigrazione e reati culturalmente motivati (comprese le mutilazioni genitali femminili), in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., October 2007, pp. 17-22. 
12 G. CASUSCELLI, Il diritto penale, in G. Casuscelli (ed.), Nozioni di diritto ecclesiastico, 
5ª ed., Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, pp. 372-373. 
13 E. OLIVITO, Giudici e legislatori di fronte alla multiculturalità in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, cit., May 2001, p. 17. 
14 C. DE MAGLIE, I reati culturalmente motivati. Ideologie e modelli penali, ETS, Pisa, 2010, 
A. BERNARDI, Il “fattore culturale” nel sistema penale, Giappichelli, Torino, 2010, F. 
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First of all, it could be worthwhile to clarify which crimes could be 
“cultural” or “culturally motivated”. Looking at the concrete procedural 
dynamic, the notion of “cultural crime” could seem indeed particularly 
broad, covering all the cases where the defendant asks an extension of 
judge’s knowledge to his cultural background, so that the court can reach a 
more correct reconstruction of the facts and, therefore, in the defendant's 
expectations, a decision more favourable to him15. 
In the light of this wide definition, doctrine suggests to "shatter" it in 
some criminological sub-categories16, which emerge directly from the 
analysis of case law17:  
- domestic violence; 
- honour killings; 
- child rights violations (slavery or refusing to send children to 
school); 
- sex crimes; 
- female genital mutilations and male circumcisions; 
- drug-related crimes; 
- crimes concerning ritual clothing. 
As it could be easily seen, almost all these types of crimes share at 
least one element: the relevance of family and interpersonal relationships, 
which, just like conceptions of honour and behaviour in the sexual and 
reproductive sphere, always constitute a dominant theme in the traditions 
and rules of different cultures and religions18. Family is undoubtedly the 
primary site in which these traditions and cultural rules are practiced and 
transmitted and so it can’t be surprising if the imprint left by the culture of 
origin can re-emerge in an overbearing way, when it comes to these issues, 
with its ancestral charge. 
Since cultural crimes, as previously said, are mainly dealt with by 
judges in absence of a criminal law rule, major disparities in case law are 
                                                          
BASILE, Immigrazione, cit., F. PARISI, Cultura dell’«altro» e diritto penale, Giappichelli, 
Torino, 2010, A. PROVERA, Tra frontiere e confini. Il diritto penale dell’età multiculturale, 
Jovene Editore, Napoli, 2018. 
15 F. BASILE, Dialogo tra un penalista e i cultori della disciplina giuridica del fenomeno 
religioso: reati contro il sentimento religioso e reati c.d. culturalmente motivati, in P. Consorti 
(ed.), Costituzione, religione e cambiamenti nel diritto e nella società, Pisa University Press, Pisa, 
2019, p. 433. 
16 F. BASILE, Le principali categorie di reati culturalmente motivate. Profili criminologici e 
normativi, in DPU - Diritto Penale e Uomo, Online review, 2019, pp. 6-7. 
17 F. PARISI, Cultura, cit., pp. 103-120; for the most recent cases, see F. BASILE, 
Ultimissime dalla giurisprudenza in materia di reati culturalmente motivati, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 30, 2018, pp. 3-6. 
18 F. BASILE, Immigrazione, cit., pp. 161-162. 
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unavoidable19. Exactly in order to avoid such uncertainties, since the ’90s 
the American and Canadian jurisprudence developed so-called “cultural 
tests”20, which aim specifically at proceduralising judge’s argumentative 
process in a series of logical steps that allow him, in the face of multicultural 
conflicts, to be able to decide with a greater degree of certainty, organizing 
and directing the reasoning towards less random rulings. 
Italian doctrine has recently suggested a new cultural test21, to be 
adopted on a regular basis by the Court of Cassation or to be included in a 
handbook which should be provided to judges who deal with cultural 
crimes.  
Here are its thirteen points: 
1. Is the "culture" category usable in this case? 
2. Describe the cultural practice and the characteristics of the group. 
3. Insert the single cultural practice in the broader cultural system of 
origin. 
4. Is the practice essential to the survival of the group, mandatory or 
optional? 
5. How much is the practice shared by the group? Or is it disputed? 
6. How would the model agent of that culture behave? 
7. How sincere and consistent is the person who claims the practice? 
8. Is the group discriminated in the society? 
9. Is there a cultural equivalent of that practice in the dominant 
culture? 
10. Does the practice cause damage? 
11. Does the practice perpetuate patriarchy? 
12. What impact does the practice have on the dominant culture? 
13. What good reasons does the cultural group have to continue the 
practice? 
                                                          
19 See e.g., on the one hand, Court of Cassation, n. 32436, 1 August 2008 (Pakistani 
charged with homicide): “The different culture of origin can be taken into positive 
consideration only to the extent that it does not conflict frontally with the values expressed 
by our Constitution which (...), if it is rightly open to the plurality of different cultures, it is 
not to the extent  of appreciating the death given in the name of them”. On the other hand, 
Court of Cassation, n. 22708, 17 March 2017 (Romani charged with homicide): the judge 
underlined how the personality of the defendants was correctly evaluated in consideration 
of a shared subculture, marked by an “insane sense of protection of the family order”. 
20 The first cultural test was developed by Canadian Supreme Court in 1996 in R. v. Van 
Der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. It was useful to make cultural rights recognized to natives by 
art. 35 Cost. effective. 
21 I. RUGGIU, Il giudice antropologo e il test culturale, in Questione Giustizia, Online 
review, n. 1, 2017, pp. 226-232. 
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As can be seen, the test, that aims at improving the degree of 
certainty of the sequence of logical-argumentative passages that each judge 
must follow before deciding on a crime culturally motivated, necessarily 
needs the advice of an anthropologist, especially answering the first six 
questions. Indeed, it would be difficult for a judge to contextualize a 
cultural practice in the broader context from which it derives, or to 
understand its degree of binding within the original group, especially when 
it comes to cultures totally distant from the dominant one. 
The recourse to anthropological support in the Italian courtrooms is, 
however, still rather rare22: beyond a resistant prejudice in favour of the 
natural sciences at the expense of the social sciences, our ritual code does 
not admit expertise to establish “the character and personality of the 
defendant and in general the psychic qualities independent of pathological 
causes” (Article 220, paragraph 2, Code of Criminal Procedure). This 
prohibition would seem to justify the choice not to use anthropologists in 
courtrooms, although the doctrine clarified that the anthropological 
expertise, in cultural crimes cases, would not have as its object the personal 
or psychic qualities of the individual, but the existence of a group 
characterized by a specific culture. Therefore, the judge would not deal with 
a report about the personality of the defendant, but only about the possible 
cultural value of the fact he committed23. 
The second part of the test, formed by the last seven questions, would 
instead bring judge’s reasoning back into a more strictly legal sphere. This, 
as it is easy to understand, precisely in order to avoid adherence to a totally 
relativist reconstructive scheme, which is essential for the anthropologist, 
who moves on a purely descriptive level, but not for the judge. On the 
contrary, the latter, required to find a balance point between different 
demands, has to contribute to delineating the new values of coexistence in 
a multicultural context. This could be done only by enhancing in the 
resolution of the conflicts those types of assessments that are strictly legal24. 
Waiting to see if this test will find success in Italian courtrooms, it is 
worth reporting a very recent ruling of Court of Cassation25 about a sexual 
                                                          
22 A. BIGIARINI, La prova culturale nel processo penale, in Cassazione Penale, n. 1, 2018, 
pp. 413-415. 
23 C. DE MAGLIE, I reati, cit., p. 157. 
24 I. RUGGIU, Il giudice, cit., pp. 230-232. 
25 Court of Cassation, n. 29613, 2 July 2018. About it, see A. PROVERA, Carezze o 
violenze? La Cassazione affronta il problema dei reati sessuali a presunto orientamento culturale, in 
Diritto penale e processo, n. 11, 2018, pp. 1432-1438; I. RUGGIU, Omnia munda mundis. La 
pratica culturale dell’„omaggio al pene” del bambino: uno studio per la cultural defense, in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 27, 2019. 
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crime committed by an Albanian man against his son: in that case, the court 
identifies some “key points”, which every judge called to deal with 
culturally motivated crimes should take into consideration, thus drafting a 
sort of “test”, which could help the judges themselves to elaborate a more 
articulated and better reasoned decision26. 
 
 
3 - The case of kirpan: the recent judgment of the Court of Cassation 
 
Without any doubts, the most debated decision about cultural crimes in 
Italy has been the one issued by the Supreme Court of Cassation in 201727, 
where the judge has upheld the conviction of a Sikh Indian for withholding 
a kirpan, the ritual dagger central to his faith. 
Sikhism, which widespread in Western society28, requires the 
exposure of five key religious symbols, the so-called “Five Ks”29: these, as 
known, include the kirpan, the knife which is an essential part of Sikh 
identity and whose carriage is mandatory. 
 In particular, the Court of Cassation has confirmed the judgment 
issued by the Court of Mantua for the crime of carrying weapons pursuant 
to art. 4, paragraph 2, of Law no. 110/1975. The pronounce aroused a huge 
media coverage30, in particular for the mention of the obligation, for the 
immigrant, “of conform his values to those of the Western world”31. 
According to the judges, it would not be tolerable that the multi-ethnic 
society, while constituting a necessity, would lead to the formation of 
“conflicting cultural archipelagos”, because the uniqueness of the cultural 
                                                          
26 F. BASILE, Quanto conta la “cultura”? La Cassazione torna sui reati c.d. culturalmente 
motivati, in Giurisprudenza Italiana, October 2018, pp. 2250-2251. More specifically, there are 
three “key points” identified by the Court of Cassation: the legal right offended and the 
degree of the offense, the nature of the cultural rule in compliance with which the crime 
was committed and the degree of integration of the defendant into the dominant culture 
of the country of arrival. 
27 Court of Cassation, n. 24084, 15 May 2017. 
28 For C. PETRUCCI, I Sikh dall’India al mondo, Liberazione, 9 May 2010, Italy hosts the 
second largest Sikh community in Europe, after the United Kingdom, with 70,000 faithfuls. 
29 F. POLI, I Sikh - la comunità dei “discepoli” dal Panjab al mondo, Edizioni Studio 
Domenicano, Bologna, 2007, p. 51. 
30 See, e.g., I. SACCHETTONI, Cassazione: i migranti devono conformarsi a nostri valori, in 
Corriere della Sera, 16 May 2017, S. MARZIALETTI, Cassazione: i migranti devono rispettare i 
nostri valori, in Sole 24 Ore, 16 May 2017, C. MELZI D’ERIL, G. E. VIGEVANI, Se un pugnale 
compromette i valori occidentali, in Sole 24 Ore, 19 May 2017. 
31 Court of Cassation, n. 24084, 15 May 2017, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 2.3. 
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and legal context of Italy, that identifies public safety as a good to be protect, 
would obstruct it32. 
The facts are known: the defendant was stopped in the street by the 
local police, who found him in possession of a knife, carried on his belt, of 
the total length of 18.5 cm and considered, therefore, suitable for offense. At 
the request of the policemen to consign it, he refused, claiming that the port 
of the knife was imposed by the precepts of his religion, Sikhism33. The 
court of first instance found the defendant guilty, but the latter appealed to 
the Court of Cassation, invoking art. 19 of the Constitution: the knife was a 
symbol of his faith and its carrying would have been justified exactly from 
his religion freedom34. As known, art. 51 of Criminal Code states that the 
exercise of a right excludes the possibility of punishing the offender. 
The ruling of the Cassation, which confirmed the judgment, is no 
surprising as the final outcome. Indeed in 2016 the same Court intervened 
on two separate occasions on that topic35, stating in both cases that the 
religious reason could not justify the conduct of the Sikh. In this way the 
previous address supported by some other judges36, who had more 
correctly balanced religious freedom and security concerns, recognizing, 
also in consideration of the limited offensiveness of the defendant’s 
conduct, prevalence to the first37, was already censored by the Supreme 
Court, albeit with very concise motivations38. 
Whereas these rulings of 2016, however, had not attracted the 
attention of public opinion, the 2018 judgment, as previously said, did. This 
can be undoubtedly explained by the judges’ mention of a supposed 
obligation, for the immigrant, to conform to the “values of the Western 
world” - an expression strongly evocative but indeed very vague and 
indefinite. 
                                                          
32 Court of Cassation, n. 24084, 15 May 2017, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 2.3. 
33 Court of Cassation, n. 24084, 15 May 2017, “Rilevato in fatto”, par. 1-2. 
34 Court of Cassation, n. 24084, 15 May 2017, “Rilevato in fatto”, par. 3. 
35 See Court of Cassation, n. 24739, 14 June 2016 and n. 25163, 16 June 2016. About these 
judgements, see A. LICASTRO, Il motivo religioso non giustifica il porto fuori dell’abitazione 
del kirpan da parte del fedele sikh (considerazione in margine alle sentenze n. 24739 e n. 25163 del 
2016 della Cassazione penale), in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 1, 2017, p. 1. 
36 See Cremona Court, n. 15, 13 January 2009 or Vicenza Court (Gip), dismissal decree, 
23 January 2009. 
37 This initial approach of criminal courts led someone to identify, in the kirpan issue, a 
sign of “traditional Italian hospitality”; see C. CARDIA, Il simbolo religioso e culturale, in 
Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 23, 2012, p. 20. 
38 On the evolution of the Italian jurisprudence about kirpan, see A. BERNARDI, 
Populismo giudiziario? L’evoluzione della giurisprudenza penale sul kirpan), in Rivista Italiana di 
Diritto e Procedura Penale, 2017, pp. 673-689. 
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4 - A questionable decision: the fundamental role of pluralism in 
Western societies 
 
The Cassation has apparently based its decision on value-related reasons, 
more connected to ethical evaluations than juridical ones39: and this can 
only arouse perplexity. If, in general, value judgment is a way of 
proceeding refractory to objective regulatory and delimiting criteria, all the 
more so in this case, given the absolute vagueness of those “Western 
values” to which the immigrant would be required to comply. The 
ambiguity of this formula is immediately demonstrated as soon as we look 
beyond Italian borders, towards other legal systems, certainly equally 
“Western”, which, however, have chosen a very different approach 
towards the issue of kirpan40. 
United Kingdom, for example, despite its particularly restrictive 
legislation on weapons, has issued in 1988 a provision authorizing people 
to carry cutting or pointed weapons “for religious reasons; or as part of any 
national costume”41, just in order to allow Sikh Indians to wear kirpan. 
In the United States, even in the absence of an ad hoc provision, 
judges based their decision on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
issued in 1993 by the Congress, in order to acquit a Sikh Indian from the 
crime of abusive port of a hidden lethal weapon42. 
In Canada, finally, in the name of multiculturalism, which in that 
country has been formalized even at constitutional level43, the Supreme 
Court has affirmed that a young Sikh is entitled to bring his kirpan to 
school44. A ban, in Court’s opinion, would have transmitted to the students 
the message that some religious practices are not worthy of protection, thus 
limiting the spread of the values of diversity and respect for others. 
So, the “values” on which the above-mentioned choices are founded 
are, without a doubt, typically “Western” ones: religious freedom and 
                                                          
39 A.M. NICO, Ordine pubblico e libertà di religione in una società multiculturale 
(Osservazioni a margine di una recente sentenza della Cassazione sul kirpan), in Osservatorio 
Costituzionale, vol. 2/2017, p. 4. 
40 A. NEGRI, Sikh condannato per porto del kirpan: una discutibile sentenza della Cassazione 
su immigrazione e “valori del mondo occidentale”, in Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, Online 
review, 3 July 2017, p. 2. 
41 Criminal Justice Act 1988, Section 139 (5). 
42 State of Ohio v. Harjinder Singh, No. C-950777-Appeal, Court of Appeals of Ohio, First 
Appellate District, Hamilton County, 31 December 1996. 
43 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art. 27. 
44 Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. About this 
decision, see M. FERRI, Gli accomodamenti ragionevoli in materia di libertà religiosa tra 
giurisprudenza della corte europea e della corte canadese, in Jus, vol. 3, 2015. 
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cultural and religious pluralism, which in the present case the Italian Court 
of Cassation has inexplicably neglected. 
And yet the latter is recognized both on international and national 
level. It is enough to recall the UN Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 200545, also approved 
with the Decision of the Council of the EU on 18 May 200646 and ratified by 
Italy in 200747; or the art. 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in force of which the EU respects cultural and religious 
diversity. 
Moreover, ECHR jurisprudence on this topic is rich and meaningful: 
since the Handyside v. United Kingdom case48, in 1976, ECHR has recognized 
a fundamental role to pluralism, understood as a so essential character of 
the democratic society that “there can be no democracy without 
pluralism”49. And it was exactly with a decision on religious freedom that 
ECHR clarified the role of the State in the face of the difficulties that can 
unavoidably arise in pluralist societies: it has the task “not to remove the 
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing 
groups tolerate each other”50. 
Coming to the Italian legal system,  the essential principle is 
enshrined in art. 2 of the Constitution, which expresses the pluralist nature 
of our democracy: it is an open and composite pluralism, which, in harmony 
with the confessional pluralism (art. 8)51, constitutes a structural profile of 
entire Italian system and whose role has now grown up to being recognized 
as one of the pillars of republican democracy and of any democratic system 
in the European Union. 
And it is exactly from those two constitutional provisions, together 
with articles 3, 7, 19 - which guarantees religious freedom - and 20, that 
Constitutional Court inferred, in its historic decision n. 203 of 198952, the 
                                                          
45 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 
2005. 
46 Council Decision of 18 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2006/515/CE). 
47 Law n. 19/2007. 
48 Handyside v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, n. 5493/72, 7 
December 1976, par. 49. 
49 As more recently reaffirmed in Refah Partisi and Other v. Turkey, European Court of 
Human Rights, nn. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, 13 February 2003, par. 89. 
50 Serif v. Greece, European Court of Human Rights, n. 38178/97, 14 December 1999, par. 
53. 
51 G. CASUSCELLI, Dal pluralismo confessionale alla multireligiosità: il diritto ecclesiastico 
e le sue fonti nel guado del post-confessionismo, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 
April 2007, p. 4. 
52 Constitutional Court, n. 203/1989. 
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supreme principle of Italian laicità53. In this context, the role of confessional 
and cultural pluralism is so decisive that it not only even founds the 
“regime” of rules from which laicità is derived, but also necessarily has to 
be the key to a democratic interpretation of that laicità54. Therefore, doctrine 
can validly describe the State demanded by Constitutional Judges as a 
“laico-pluralist” one55, highlighting the indissoluble bond between the two 
principles. 
Laicità, citing the words of the Constitutional Court, “does not imply 
indifference to religion but the State guarantee for the protection of freedom 
of religion, under the religious and cultural pluralism“56. Among the 
corollaries of this supreme principle, moreover, it is worth remembering the 
protection of the minorities57; it is one of the features, together with others 
as the duty of impartiality and equidistance from any religion, which 
defines Italian laicità. 
It is clear, therefore, that in the present case the Court of Cassation 
made a sort of “political” choice58, preferring, among the "Western values” 
                                                          
53 It is preferable to leave the word laicità in Italian, without translating it, at least for 
two essential reasons: firstly, to underline and distinguish the specificities of Italian 
approach towards religions and religious freedom, an active and positive one; secondly, 
because its most common literal translation would be “secularism”, a wide-ranging and 
ambiguous concept. According to National Secular Society, the British association who 
promotes secularism since 1866, it consists essentially of three principles: separation of 
religious institutions from State institutions, freedom to practice one's faith or belief and 
equality “so that our religious beliefs or lack of them doesn't put any of us at an advantage 
or a disadvantage”. See National Secular Society website, www.secularism.org.uk/what-is-
secularism.html/. This definition could actually embrace very different contexts: for 
instance, both Ireland and the US are “secular” States, but, as clarified by High Court of 
Ireland in 2009, “where the terms of the Establishment Clause are neutral, or «blind» as to 
religion, the Constitution of Ireland actively recognises the existence of diverse religious 
denominations and guarantees them certain rights. It might be said that in United States 
jurisprudence there is a wall of separation; under the Constitution of Ireland there is a 
constitutional «domain» of religious recognition” (McNally v Ireland [2009] IEHC 573, 17 
December 2009, paragraph 135). Specifically, about Irish constitutional framework 
governing State and religion, see at least E. DALY, Religion, Law and the Irish State, Clarus 
Press, Dublin, 2012; G. WHYTE, Religion, in G. HOGAN, G. WHYTE, D. KENNY, R. 
WALSH, Kelly: the Irish Constitution, Bloomsbury Professional, Dublin, 2018, pp. 2457-2509. 
54 J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, La laicità nella giurisprudenza amministrativa: da principio 
supremo a “simbolo religioso”, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., March 2009, p. 9. 
55 N. MARCHEI, La giurisprudenza ordinaria in materia penale: le contraddittorie anime del 
principio di laicità, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., February 2009, p. 13. 
56 Constitutional Court, n. 203/1989, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 4. 
57 Constitutional Court, n. 329/1997. 
58 A. BERNARDI, Populismo giudiziario?, cit., p. 684, defines the judgment as a 
“ideogically influenced” one. 
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- generally mentioned but not specified - , security to religious freedom, 
laicità and pluralism, the latter being cited only en passant, in paragraph 2.3 
of the decision, in its declination of “social pluralism”. This choice, 
however, ends up contrasting with the hierarchy of principles identified by 
the Constitutional Court in the last decades: supreme principles, as laicità, 
possess a value even higher than the other provisions of constitutional 
rank59 and, as such, are meant to prevail over them. 
Not to mention the difficulties in identifying the constitutional 
character of safety, as doctrine is still debating about the existence of an 
actual “right to security”60. 
In summary, the motivational process followed by the Supreme 
Court, and above all the ambiguous and misleading mention of the 
obligation to comply with some indefinite and arbitrarily identifiable 
Western values, has certainly to be censored. 
Beyond the present case, the basic problem about kirpan, in a 
perspective of “positive” laicità61, is to find an accommodation between 
security concerns and religious freedom. 
In such a view, it must be mentioned the Bill presented in Italian 
Senate on 6 May 2015, aimed at addressing directly the issue of the port of 
kirpan62. This proposal is based on a pilot project of Cremona police 
concluded with the production of a kirpan in all respects similar to the 
traditional one, but without the characteristics suitable to make it a cutting 
weapon, judged congruous also by the Italian Sikh communities. The Bill 
intends to authorize all Sikhs to carry their traditional religious knife, as 
long as it is tailored in this way and, in any case, provided with a special 
recognizable sign. 
The Bill, which has been presented again in Parliament in May 
201863, is now passing the exam of 1st Standing Committee of Constitutional 
                                                          
59 Constitutional Court, n. 1146/1988, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 2.1. 
60 Y.M. CITINO, Sicurezza e stato di diritto nella minaccia dei foreign terrorist fighters, in 
DirittiFondamentali.it, Online review, n. 2, 2019, p. 6. On this debate, see, ex multis, T.E. 
FROSINI, Il diritto costituzionale alla sicurezza, in forumcostituzionale.it, Online review, 2006; 
T.F. GIUPPONI, La sicurezza e le sue "dimensioni costituzionali”, in forumcostituzionale.it, 
Online review, 2008. 
61 G. CASUSCELLI, La laicità e le democrazie: la laicità della ‘Repubblica democratica’ secondo 
la Costituzione italiana, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., 2007, p. 9. 
62 Senato della Repubblica, XVII Legislatura, DDL S. 1910 - “Disposizioni in materia di 
porto del Kirpan da parte dei cittadini o degli stranieri di confessione Sikh legalmente 
residenti nel territorio della Repubblica”. 
63 Camera dei Deputati, XVIII Legislatura, DDL A.C. 346 - “Disposizioni in materia di 
porto del Kirpan da parte dei cittadini o degli stranieri di confessione Sikh legalmente 
residenti nel territorio della Repubblica”. 
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Affairs and could represent, on the one hand, an effective solution to an 
increasingly felt problem and, on the other hand, a brilliant example, also 
in our legal system, of forms of accommodation that respect at the same 
time security needs and fundamental rights. 
 
 
5 - Conclusions: the centrality of human dignity 
 
Beyond the specificities of single cases, the whole issue of cultural crimes 
can be faced with a uniform approach, if addressed from a different 
perspective. 
If it is certain that multicultural societies pose new challenges about 
the respect of legal system’s fundamental values, a point of balance has to 
be identified: what a laico State can require is that anyone accepts the 
pluralistic nature of its constitutional system, without the claim that they 
spontaneously accept all the other principles which found the latter64. Not 
forcing them to any other adhesion means first and foremost enhancing the 
same pluralism on which the laico State is based. 
In other words, just the respect of the methodological approach 
adopted by the legal system could be demanded: the respect of that 
fundamental "pact on the method" consisting in the renunciation of that 
little of its own specificity which is necessary for avoiding social 
disintegration65. For what concerns people coming from other cultures, ask 
them for more would mean denying that same method and consequently 
those same principles, on which the pluralist society is founded, and 
requesting an inadmissible assimilation. 
Imposing on everyone the obligation “of conform his values” to the 
ones shared by the majority, whatever they may be, would contradict the 
supreme principle of laicità. Indeed, the latter would be denied if the State 
chose to follow an "assimilationist" policy in order to level out different 
cultural and religious expressions66, because laicità is not an ideology, but a 
framework67, within which promoting pluralism.  
                                                          
64 E. GROSSO, I doveri costituzionali, Lecture given at 2009 Annual Congress of 
Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti titled “Lo Statuto costituzionale del non cittadino”, 
Cagliari, 16-17 October 2009, p. 17. 
65 E. GROSSO, I doveri costituzionali, cit., p. 19. 
66 S. MONTESANO, Dalla laicità dello Stato alla laicità per lo Stato. Il paradigma laico tra 
principio e valore, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 36, 2017, pp. 35-36. 
67 C. McCRUDDEN, Quando i giudici parlano di Dio. Fede, pluralismo e diritti umani davanti 
alle Corti, il Mulino, Bologna, 2019, p. 203. 
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No one can be subjected to a specific culture, if not at the cost of 
offending his/her personal conscience, understood as that intimate and 
privileged relationship of an individual with himself which constitutes both 
the spiritual-cultural and the ethical-juridical basis of fundamental rights68. 
This intimate sphere, as clarified by Constitutional Court in 1991, “must be 
considered as the profoundest juridical risult of the universal idea of human 
dignity that surrounds those (fundamental) rights”.69 
Coming to cultural crimes, precisely the paramount “constitutional 
value”70 of human dignity could play an essential role. If it represents the 
insurmountable ethical minimum71 which is at the same time premise, 
foundation, essential shared element and limit of all fundamental rights72, 
its relevance cannot be ignored in courtrooms. Especially when defendants 
invoke the exercise of an inalienable right as justification for committing the 
crime, judges necessarily have to take into consideration if and how that 
right could be limited.  
Dignity, together with proportionality, could lead the way: the first 
one, evaluated both as the dignity of the victim of the crime and the one of 
the offender, the second one, as an essential principle73 when it comes to 
balancing different rights and interests, as security may be. A pluralist 
Constitution is precisely characterized by the fact that fundamental rights 
are never affirmed in absolute terms, but are part of a complex 
constitutional framework, in which other rights and other constitutionally 
protected interests can legitimately limit their scope74. 
                                                          
68 L.S. MARTUCCI, Laicità e diritti nei programmi di deradicalizzazione dal terrorismo 
religioso, in Dirittifondamentali.it, Online review, n. 2, 2018, p. 13. 
69 Constitutional Court, n. 467/1991, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 4. 
70 Constitutional Court, n. 293/2000, “Considerato in diritto”, par. 4. 
71 J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Propaganda religiosa: la libertà silente, Giappichelli, Torino, 
2018, p. 162. 
72 In EU law, Treaty on European Union includes, at art. 2, human dignity among the 
values which found Union and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ 
Title I is headed “Dignity”. With regards to international law, Both International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights declare in their Preamble that inalienable rights “derive from the inherent dignity 
of the human person”.  
73 Recently, EU Court of Justice defined proportionality as a general principle of 
European Union law. See Egenberger v. Evangelisches Werk für Diakonie und Entwicklung eV, 
C-414/16, 17 April 2018, par. 68. 
74 M. CARTABIA, I principi di ragionevolezza e proporzionalità nella giurisprudenza 
costituzionale italiana, Lecture given at “Conferenza trilaterale delle Corte costituzionali italiana, 
portoghese e spagnola”, Roma, 24-26 October 2013, p. 9. 
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In this context, dignity could offer a solution: understood as the 
“mutual recognition” that underlies all individual rights75, every concrete 
attack to that ethical minimum has to be punished76. So, this is the case of 
some cultural crimes, like sexual offences, domestic violences or child rights 
violations. 
But when judges deal with different types of cultural crimes, without 
a clear identification of the victim as the kirpan case, they have to wonder 
how they can guarantee the full realisation of human dignity, an 
achievement which necessarily implies respect and support for religious 
freedom as expression of a search for answers to existential doubts77.  
In conclusion, in that circumstance, a decision which shows clear 
hostility to other cultures would firstly entail the marginalization of the 
openings in a plural and multicultural sense of our Constitution78, starting 
precisely from those in religious matters referred to in articles 8 and 19. 
Then, and foremost, it would not reach the essential goal of a legal system 
built, together with others, upon the supreme principle of laicità: to identify 
the most suitable solution for the development of human dignity79. 
 
 
                                                          
75 S. DELLAVALLE, Dall’imago Dei al riconoscimento reciproco. L’evoluzione del concetto 
di dignità umana alla luce della difesa della libertà religiosa, in Costituzionalismo.it, Online 
review, n. 3, 2014, par. 6. 
76 J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Propaganda religiosa, cit., p. 164. 
77 S. DELLAVALLE, Dall’imago Dei, cit., par. 6. 
78 A. BERNARDI, Populismo giudiziario?, cit., p. 703. 
79 C. McCRUDDEN, Quando i giudici parlano, cit., p. 204. 
